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Aristotle on Reason. Practical Reason, and Living Veil
D. K.W. Modrak
From the beginning the Nicomachean Ethics is about practical thinking, 
how we choose or should choose to act and to urge others to act.1 Any form 
of thought that requires the conceptualization of one or more actions is a 
type of practical thinking.2 Thus the deliberations of a legislator, the 
scheming of a huckster and the choices of a good woman are all instances of 
practical reason. In view of its importance, it is especially disturbing that 
Aristotle's account of practical thinking is open to the charge of inadequacy 
on two major fronts: ( 1 ) the cogency of his analysis of moral weakness; and 
(2) the absence of a genuine conceptual niche for ohronesis. whose work 
seems to be done by ethike arete, by euboulia and by soohia.
I
Since Aristotle's treatment of akrasia sheds considerable light on his 
conception of practical thinking, I propose to begin with it. Socrates left his 
successors with a dilemma: either give up the project of a rationalistic ethics 
or deny the existence of moral weakness. Indeed the failure to act according 
to one s best judgment about which action to perform seems peculiarly 
irrational and presumably would have been dismissed long ago as a form of 
madness had it not been quite widespread among rational animals. This fact 
causes Aristotle to reject Socrates’ view that akrasia is impossible, even 
though he agrees with Socrates that right reason issues in right actions. 
Aristotle's strategy is to establish the possibility of akrasia while at the same 
time retaining the kernal of truth in Socrates' argument—namely that 
knowledge of the universal is not dragged around by passion. According to 
Aristotle, akrasia involves a perceptual failure: the akratic agent fails to 
apply a general principle s/he accepts to the particular circumstances that 
provide the context for the action. The akratic agent resembles the 
geometry student who knows that the sum of the angles of a triangle are 
180° but fails to realize that a given figure is a triangle and hence is 
ignorant of the sum of its angles, or the person who knows that mules are 
sterile and yet nevertheless has the momentary impression that a particular 
mule is pregnant (67a35-39).
1 I have not been able "in the short time allowed by the dock'' to mention 
the many articles and books that have influenced my thinking about the 
topics discussed here. Below I cite other authors only when their work is 
explicitly mentioned.
2 I use "action" both for a plan of action existing as the object of an agent's 
thought and for an observable performance in the physical world.
Reviewed from the perspective of Aristotle's account of the relation 
between thought and perception, this line of analysis becomes more 
plausible. Apprehending a sensible particular as an instance of a universal 
is a constant feature of thinking. This feature is at the heart of Aristotle's 
claim that even the most abstract forms of reasoning are not possible 
without imagery (phantasmata).3 In such cases the image presents a 
sensible particular that the thinker uses as an arbitrary example of the 
universal, the proper object of the thought.3 4 In the case of perceptual 
judgment and practical reasoning, the apprehension of the sensible 
particular is at the center of the cognitive experience, and the particular is 
no longer treated indifferently as an arbitrary example but becomes instead 
the specific object of the judgment. Here the point of subsuming the 
particular under a given universal is not to enable the thinker to 
contemplate the universal but rather to enable her or him to categorize the 
particular. Classifying concrete objects provides the information needed for 
manipulating these objects in action and for understanding the world in 
which we live. Since every concrete particular exemplifies a number of 
different universale, each standing in numerous relations to other universale, 
the failure to apprehend the particular as an instance of a specific universal 
is easily explained (cf.67a26-30; 1142a20-22; 1147a5-7). Moreover, the 
complexity of the relations among universal also leaves room for further 
confusions, e.g., for perceiving that C, a honey dessert, is yellow and hence 
misperceiving C's flavor (cf. 425b4-5).
Just as a perceiver may fail to bring her/his general knowledge to 
bear on a particular case, the akrates may fail to respond in accordance with 
his/her moral principles. The akratic agent fails to recognize that his/her 
present situation falls under the appropriate universal and acts instead on 
the basis of another applicable universal ( 1147a24-b3). Aristotle supposes 
that the akrates with a sweet tooth holds two true beliefs, namely, "sweets 
should be avoided," and "sweets are pleasant to eat." He spies a dessert, 
concludes, "this is pleasant to eat," and promptly eats the dessert. Only later 
does he realize that the other principle also held in this instance. Because 
practical reasoning ultimately terminates in a judgment about what is to be 
done, its object is a particular embedded in a context supplied by the agent's 
character and intellect. In the case described the context consists in pleasant 
associations rather than moral principles. Since this context affirms the 
pleasurableness of the object, ohantasia as the vehicle for pleasurable 
sensations is the operative faculty instead of reason (433al0; 1150b28). By 
assimilating akrasia to a more general type of cognitive failure—the failure
3 427bl6,431al5,432a8,44% 31, 1378b9.
4 See Modrak, A risto tle: The Power o f Perception, chapters 5 and 7.
to recognize a particular as an instantiation of a specific universal, Aristotle 
preserves the intelligibility of akratic behavior.
Unfortunately, Aristotle's explanation of akrasia seems at odds with 
his treatment of moral principles. Principles of conduct are not merely 
entertained; they are ingrained in one's character as a result of having 
performed the right actions with the right attitudes in the past. To know in 
this instance is to interpret one s situation in accordance with the principle. 
To meet this objection, Aristotle emphasizes the tenuous quality of the 
akratic agent s knowledge of the principle; just as a drunkard can quote 
philosophy without understanding or a student parrot his/her teacher, the 
akrates espouses the principle. Now the explanation is threatened from 
another quarter: in what sense can the akrates be said to have knowledge at 
all? To the extent that Aristotle has an answer, it must turn on the 
difference between accepting a principle as true and having made it a part of 
oneself (cf.l 147al0-24)5 The more deeply a principle is ingrained in one s 
character, the less likely one is to fail to recognize its applications.
On my reading of N. B. VII.3, the akrates does not apply the 
appropriate universal to a specific object. Charles takes the opposite tack.5 6 
He believes that Aristotle allows the akratic agent to draw the conclusion 
that doing x is best. This conclusion is then ignored in favor of the 
conclusion that y is good. The akratic agent (Charles says) fails to 
appropriately accept the first conclusion due to his not bringing his 
motivational judgments in line with his valuational ones. There is little 
doubt that Aristotle's analysis turns in part on a gap between value 
judgments and motivation, for Aristotle claims that the akrates unlike the 
akolastos preserves the arche, the moral principle that should issue in the 
right action ( 1151 a 11 -19 ). There are, however, two serious drawbacks to 
Charles' development of this insight. First VII. 3 offers scant support for it.7 
Not only is there no suggestion that the akrates completes two practical 
syllogisms, but there is also no mention of a difference between types of 
acceptance or between value and desire. The nature of practical first
5 The akrates retains the principle among his/her beliefs and thus 
preserves the arche unlike the akolastos who rejects the principle as false 
(1151al 1-19; cf. 1140bl6-19).
6 D. Charles, A risto tie  's Philosophy o f Action, chaps. 3 and 4.
7 Later at 1151al-3, a type of akrates who deliberates is mentioned but 
nowhere does Aristotle suggest that this deliberation issues in a decision to 
act. The explanation given in MB. VII.3 denies that the akrates draws but 
ignores the right conclusion nor does the De Motu An.'s account of action 
leave room for such behavior.
principles is such that a total split between valuational and motivational 
factors is not a possibility. What happens in the case of akrasia is a partial 
split occasioned by the akratic agent s tenuous hold on the principle and the 
subsumption of his/her particular circumstances under a competing 
desirability criterion.
But you might object: Aristotle says that the akrates when he is in a 
state of passion either does not have the last premiss (teleutaia protasis) or 
has it in the sense in which a drunken man may utter the verses of 
Empedocles ( 1147b9-12). If "teleutaia protasis'* refers to the conclusion of 
the correct syllogism, then isn't this evidence that the akrates reaches two 
conclusions instead of one? It is not. Aristotle typically uses protasis for 
premiss rather than conclusion and this usage would cohere better with the 
restofVII.3. Unfortunately, identifying the teleutaia protasis with the 
minor premiss does not solve all our problems. In the sweet food example, 
the akrates seems to have the appropriate minor premiss, namely, this food 
is sweet, which seems to figure in both the realized syllogism and the correct 
alternative. Nevertheless, Aristotle might believe that in most real life cases 
of practical reasoning, different middle terms are operative. For instance, 
the same food is dry and bitter. Were the akrates thinking clearly he would 
perceive the food’s dryness, subsume it under the appropriate universal and 
eat it, as it is, he responds to the premiss, "this is bitter," and avoids the 
food.
Aristotle’s detailed explanation of akrasia in VI 1.3 is tailored to fit 
the impetuous akrates who confused by sensual desire fails to put 2 and 2 
together. Subsequently Aristotle mentions a type of akrates who deliberates 
(115 1 al-3 ,1152a27-28), but presumably s/he reaches only an intermediate 
conclusion, since here too the difference between akrasia (of all types) and 
vice is drawn on the grounds that the akrates acts against choice (para 
prohairesin) ( 1151 a8 ). The akrates might decide, for instance, that a type of 
grain should be eaten because it is a dry food, but fail to make the 
judgments necessary to implement this decision (cf. 1147a5-7). Aristotle 
hypothesizes that the failure to perceive one's current situation in 
accordance with one’s internalized values must ultimately be explained by 
appeal to a physiological state that causes one to lose the proper perspective. 
Just as in illness, we misperceive our circumstances, believing for instance 
that a «rack on the wall is a dangerous animal, in states of sensual arousal or 
anger, we misperceive our circumstances (460b3-l 1 ). If we are akrateis. we 
are prone to such misperceptions. Since perception is a psychophysical state, 
disturbances in the body occasion perceptual mistakes (cf.460bl 1-16); hence 
akrasia is partially due to a bodily state (1147b6-9, cf.l 151a5-6). Here 
again Aristotle extends his analysis of perceptual error in general to akrasia.
Despite its physiological component, akrasia is blameworthy. The 
blameworthiness of an act, for Aristotle, is not decided solely by reference to 
its circumstances; the relevant question is whether the agent might have had 
a different character and hence might have acted correctly (cf.l 114a4-7).
The akratic agent through self-discipline might well have acquired the 
ability to withstand his/her sensual desires, such that when confronted with 
a sweet food, for instance, s/he did not become disoriented and fail to 
recognize which universal to subsume the food under. It is this failure for 
which the akrates is blamed not for succumbing to a temptation that given 
his character was in fact irresistible (cf.l 114a3-23).
II
The relation between the agent s immediate circumstances and the 
universels applied to those circumstances provided the key to understanding 
Aristotle's solution to the problem of akrasia. The same relation is central to 
his account of ohronesis.
Now all the states [of practical thought] converge, as 
might be expected, to the same point; for when we speak of 
judgement (gnome) and understanding (sunesis) and practical 
wisodm (ohronesis) and reason (nous) we credit the same 
people with possessing judgement and reason and with having 
practical wisdom and understanding. For all these faculties deal 
with ultimates (ton eschaton). i.e., with particulars (ton kath' 
hekaston). (1143a25-28)
Phronesis is the paradigm for practical thinking; it includes all of the 
laudatory aspects of the other forms, and it enables its possessor to live 
virtuously. Phronesis is "an eye of the soul" that enables a virtuous person 
to "see" what should be done in a particular case (1144a30; cf.l 114b6-8,
1143b 13) Just as a perceiver may have to take various steps to achieve a 
clear perception of a selected object (for instance, move closer to the object, 
remove objects obstructing the view, etc.), the ohronimos may have to 
consider various strategies initially. Nonetheless, the recognition of the right 
strategy has the same immediacy as an act of sense perception.8 The 
"seeing" of the ohronimos is a more complex operation than seeing a color, 
and thus at 1142a26-29 Aristotle compares it to the perception of a common 
sensible—an object such as shape perceived through the joint activity of 
several sense modalities. When we perceive a particular triangular shape 
through the common sense, we apprehend that figure as an instantiation of
8 See Modrak, “Aisthesis in the Practical Syllosism," Philosophical Studies 30.
the universal, triangularity, while ohronesis determines the right rule 
embodied in the morally correct action. Through ohronesis. the agent 
apprehends the end as manifested in particular actions.9 Similarly when a 
ohronimos recognizes that a particular performance is an act of courage, s/he 
apprehends the act as an instantiation of a universal principle prescribing 
courageous behavior.10
Aristotle's grounds for assimilating practical thinking to a kind of 
moral perception are several. Elsewhere he uses the distinction between 
particular and universal to differentiate between perceptual and noetic 
activity, and thus he associates practical thinking with a kind of perception. 
In addition, all thinking is closely connected with perception. Thinking 
depends upon imagery. Even the most abstract objects are thought in 
images (ohantasmata) that function as sensuous contents (aisthemata) for 
noetic activity (431al5, 432a9). Thus a certain type of perceptual activity, 
namely ohantasia. serves as the substratum for thinking in general.
Practical thinking is even more closely related to perceptual activity because 
it is directed upon concrete particulars that are the objects of perception. In 
the De Anim a Aristotle extends the explanatory model for perception to 
thinking.11 On this model the cognitive object determines the character of 
the cognitive activity. In the case of practical thinking, the object as 
represented determines the character of the thought and the corresponding 
action. The representation of a dessert as sweet and delightful determines 
the character of the akrates* cognition and behavior; the representation of 
the same dessert as sweet and harmful determines the character of the 
soohron s thought and action.
The perceptual character of ohronesis causes Aristotle to compare 
ohronesis to theoretical nous which apprehends the ultimate principles 
(primitive propositions) of a science. Both faculties are concerned with the 
expression of the universal in the particular; nous arrives at its objects 
through the apprehension of particular cases (88a4-8; 100al4-bl5;l 143a35- 
b6), and ohronesis apprehends its objects as instantiations of universals. 
They differ in that the objects of nous provide the upper limit in terms of 
generality whereas the objects of ohronesis are ultimate particulars, specific 
actions to be performed in unique situations.
9 An action manifests or exemplifies a principle of conduct if it accords with 
that principle.
10 To use Irwin s translation of kata ton orthon logon ( A ristotJe
N i com a eñe an Ethics)·, the morally correct action "expresses the right rule."
11 De An. III.4 ,6-8. See also Modrak, chapter five.
The account of ohronesis seems fairly straightforward until we begin 
to consider ohronesis in relation to moral virtue and the lesser intellectual 
virtue, euboulia. To make a niche for ohronesis in relation to the former, 
Aristotle stresses first the role of ohronesis in determining the standard by 
which means are chosen and second the role of ohronesis in choosing the 
means to ends fixed by moral virtue. This is already problematic, and the 
difficulty is compounded when he defines euboulia as correctness in 
deliberation about means to an end apprehended by ohronesis. Is there an 
interpretative strategy that would allow Aristotle to maintain all three 
positions without inconsistency?
Phronesis is necessary for moral virtue, and virtue is necessary for 
ohronesis (Æ E  VI. 12). Some of Aristotle's remarks suggest a quite 
uncomplicated connection-virtue provides the end to be achieved by an 
action and ohronesis apprehends the means to that end ( 1144a6-9). The 
virtuous person seeks in his or her actions to achieve a mean between 
extremes of passion. Since passions do not respond immediately to 
argument, virtue is acquired through a process of conditioning. If we 
consistently avoid over-eating, we come in time to desire only appropriate 
amounts of food. This desire is constitutive of temperance. During the early 
developmental stage, the foundation for virtue can be acquired through 
training provided by persons possessing ohronesis. but mature virtue 
involves the autonomous choice of right actions. Deciding what and how 
much to eat on any given occasion requires moral insight as well as the 
general desire to be temperate. On the other hand, the ability to recognize 
through ohronesis which amount is appropriate needs the context 
determined by the desire to be temperate. "This is why we call soohrosune 
by this name; we imply that it preserves (sozousan) one's ohronesis."
1140bl 1-12.
This tidy picture becomes more complicated when we look at other 
parts of the story. By definition, moral virtue is a disposition to choose the 
mean relative to oneself determined by the principle (logos) which the 
ohronimos would use ( 1107al ). Virtue is a hexis that issues in right actions 
performed at the right time in the right way. These actions are chosen for 
their own sake; they embody a mean between extremes of appetites or 
passions; they are the same in character as the actions that an agent must 
perform to acquire moral virtue. In the choice of a virtuous action, both 
deliberation and desire play a role; the agent acts in accordance with both 
his/her values and wants. What then is the logos determined by ohronesis? 
The easiest answer is: the standard which defines the virtue in question.
The objective standard in the case of courage—the mean between cowardice 
and rashness— is the recognition that under certain circumstances one ought
to be willing to die for one’s city-state (111 5a25-35). The drawback to this 
answer is that a person might behave rashly who possessed this logos. Such 
a person would construe "appropriate circumstances” too broadly. The gap 
between general principles and particular circumstances motivates Aristotle 
to posit a distinctly practical form of reason ( 1141 b 14-21 ). Perhaps, then, 
the logos just is the mean between extremes in this context. If so, the 
definition becomes redundant—"to choose the mean as determined by the 
mean...” A compromise between the two seems to be the best answer: the 
logos is the application of the correct general principle to the particular 
circumstances. The standard for the courageous act on the battlefield is not 
the completely general and hence qualified standard, but rather the 
prescriptive principle, one ought to risk one's life for one's city-state.12
In comparing ohronesis to euboulia. Aristotle associates ohronesis 
with the end, and similar considerations seem to motivate the claim that the 
akrates might be clever but not practically wise. Euboulia is the ability to 
deliberate well about the proper means to a good end. To reflect on the 
means to an end, one must in some sense consider the end. The difference 
between ohronesis and euboulia must turn on the difference between 
apprehending an end and subsuming it under some broader objective. One 
might, for example, exhibit euboulia in determining how best to hold one’s 
battle position but ohronesis in deciding to do this in order to behave 
courageously. The akrates by contrast fails to subsume his immediate ends 
under the appropriate moral principle. Hence the akrates lacks ohronesis.
He might, nevertheless, be quite good at selecting effective means to his 
immediate ends.
At this point, Aristotle seems to have two lines on ohronesis. One 
establishes that ohronesis is the source of the moral prescriptions that are 
exhibited in the virtuous person's actions (1143a8-10). The other identifies 
ohronesis with the ability to recognize which actions will satisfy the virtuous 
person's ends. Although each position is coherent and provides the basis for 
distinguishing between ohronesis and the other moral and intellectual 
virtues, the fit between the two remains problematic. If Aristotle has an 
answer, it must turn on construing the notions of end and means in a way 
that allows both ohronesis and virtue to be involved in the determination of 
both the end and the chosen means. In the case of ends, this is relatively 
easy. Reason unaided by desire cannot bring about action (433a23-30); 
unless the agent wants to be courageous or has some other goal requiring
12 Cf. Aristotle's formulation of the major premisses of practical syllogisms 
in N.E VII.3 and De M otu An. 7.
courageous action, s/he will not behave courageously. Wants can be 
informed by reason but they are at the core non-rational and respond to 
conditioning rather than argument. Courage is the state that results from 
conditioning the emotional capacity for fear. Together virtue and ohronesis 
fix the end; the former by providing the emotional basis for adopting an end, 
and the latter by conceptualizing it. The first premiss of a practical syllogism 
expresses the content of the intellectual component of a practical principle 
while the motivational component determines its mode of apprehension.13 
Included among the akratic agent's beliefs is the moral principle that should 
issue in the right action. But the principle is not put into play because the 
appetitive/e motional state of the agent is inhospitable to its application. In 
contrast, the soohron’s character insures that his desires will not obscure his 
principles.
Ill
In N  B. VI. 12, Aristotle ponders, what good will wisdom (soohia) do 
us if ohronesis is sufficient for eudaimonia and conversely if wisdom is 
sufficient of what use will ohronesis be? In Book X, he compounds the 
problem by suggesting that soohia is sufficient. This prompts the question: 
can we by appealing toAristotie’s conception of thinking find support for an 
inclusive conception of the final good where both soohia and ohronesis have 
a role to play? There are striking similarities between the operation of 
theoretical nous and practical nous. In both cases, sensuous contents of 
particulars are manipulated by the thinker in a way that yields a universal 
instantiated by the particular. The direction of the thought is different 
insofar as the particulars serve solely as the means to the universal in 
theoretical thinking but remain at the center of the cognition in practical 
thinking. Moreover, the ability to move from particular cases to universals 
is essential to both types of thinking. All objects of knowledge are derived 
from particulars;14 and ohronesis as exercised by the legislator is the 
apprehension of general principles. Since thinking about more difficult 
objects enables one to think even more clearly about other objects (429b3- 
4), the person possessing soohia will be especially well-equipped to think
13 See Modrak, ,lAisthesis■■,,
14 Pst. An. 1.18.11.19; M et IV, De An. ÏII.8.
about practical questions. *5 Yet at best this only shows that the possession 
of sophia will benefit the ohronimos not the converse.
A more promising approach is to look at the De A nim ât account of 
the nsuche. since the joint activity of the perceptual, appetitive and noetic 
faculties envisaged there provides the theoretical foundation for an inclusive 
conception of human excellence. This conception is prominent in the analysis 
of action. "These two then appear to be the sources of movement, appetite 
and mind (nous), if one supposes that imagination is a kind of thought 
(voesin)" (433al 0-11 ). Every voluntary movement of an animal of any sort 
has a cognitive component, the presentation through sense or intellect of a 
putative object of desire, and a motivational component the active desire to 
pursue or avoid the object presented.16 The convergence of cognitive and 
motivational objects is typically in the case of humans the convergence of 
rational and appetitive faculties. This is why Aristotle includes both in the 
description of virtue. Moreover, since action based on deliberation is typical 
of human beings, the intellectual virtues will be as necessary for right action 
as the moral ones. Even though the employment of practical nous will be 
far more important than that of theoretical nous. Aristotle in view of the 
similarities among noetic activités, quite naturally assumes that people who 
exhibit one type of nous are likely to possess the other as well ( 1143a25- 
28).
Rationality distinguishes human life from other forms of animal life; 
yet rationality is dependent upon the perceptual faculty for its objects.
"Since seemingly nothing exists separate from sensible magnitudes, the 
objects of thought (noeta) are in the sensible forms, both abstract objects and 
the states and affections of sensible things." (432a4-6) In addition, a 
perceptual power, imagination, is the source of the images that serve as the 
material substrata for thought. Because it is dependent upon the perceptual 
faculty, the rational faculty is indirectly dependent upon the body; 
however, the perceptual faculty is exercised through bodily organs and 
hence is dependent in a quite straight-forward way on the nutritive faculty. 
Thus the exercise of a human mind differs in important particulars from the
*5 Granted, in practical contexts Aristotle sometimes compares the person 
who has theory but no practical experience unfavorably to the person having 
experience but lacking theoretical knowledge ( 1141 b 17-21 ). However, the 
knowledge in question is quite specialized and limited. Sophia is the highest 
virtue precisely because it is the most comprehensive form of knowledge; 
hence it is unlikely that Aristotle would believe that a person lacking in 
years and experience could possess sonhia.
16 De An. III.9-11; De M otu An. 6-7.
life of a disembodied mind. Consequently, the fit between the psychology 
and an account of human flourishing that identified human excellence with 
the superior function of the most abstract form of reasoning could scarcely 
be worst.
Nevertheless, we seem to find a peculiarly intellectualist conception of 
human life at the end of the Nico mache an Ethics. Consider, for example, 
(a) the identification of the person with the power of thought (to 
diavoetikon: to vooun) in N E  IX.4 and X.717 or (b) the identification of the 
highest virtue with contemplation in N E  X.7-8. With respect to (a) it is 
worth noting that the person is identified not with the capacity for 
contemplation per se but rather with the faculty for thought. The activities 
of the latter include practical thinking as well contemplation, and excellence 
in the exercise of this faculty will consist in all forms of intellectual virtue.* 18 
Since ohronesis requires moral virtue, an inclusive conception of eudaimonia 
would seem to follow from the identification of the person with his/her 
rational faculty. In addition, in N E  IX.9, human life is described as 
essentially the activity of perceiving or thinking, and the reflective 
awareness of self is the consciousness of these activities. This represents a 
further broadening of the conception of the distinctly human core capacities 
to include all forms of cognition.
By contrast the conception of eudaimonia in ME X.7-8 seems to be 
irredeemably intellectualist. Even though Aristotle calls the virtue of the 
composite human being "human virtue” and contemplation "god-like," he 
nevertheless urges us to strain every muscle to live as much like gods as 
possible. Eudaimonia realized through contemplation is perfect and 
separate.19 Certain features of Aristotle's account mitigate against a radical 
separation of contemplation from other forms of virtue. The life of 
contemplation requires the necessities of life (1177a30) and to this extent 
would require at least some of the moral virtues. While it is possible to 
exercise soohia alone, living among other scholars facillitates its use 
( 1177b 1 ). Living in a community with others requires ohronesis and the 
moral virtues. Finally, unlike the gods we are not able to engage in 
contemplation continuously; hence at times even the wisest among us can 
only achieve secondary eudaimonia. "the life expressing the other virtue", 
namely, moral virtue, for which ohronesis is needed. In short, there is an
*7 1116al8, 23; cf. 1178a2-7.
18 Even in X.8, the contrast is drawn between the life of reason and the life 
of moral virtue not between two types of intellectual virtue (soohia and 
ohronesisM 1178a8-b8).
19 1178a23: kechorismene; 1177a 18: teleia.
inclusive conception of human excellence at work here too, but it is one that 
countenances a hierarchical ordering of faculties and virtues. Thinking in its 
most excellent form will not be practical.
It is widely believed that the presence of an inteilectualist strain in 
Aristotle's ethics undermines the project of identifying human excellence 
with the life of the ohronimos. Up to a point, it does. However, the 
theoretical requirements of the life of ohronesis and the practical 
requirements of the life of contemplation have the consequence that the life 
of an actual eudaimon. philosopher or statesman, would be a mixed life.
